Types of Research
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Many low- and middle-income countries remain challenged by a financial infrastructure gap, evidenced by very low numbers of bank branches and automated teller machines (ATMs) (e.g., 2.9 branches per 100,000 people in Ethiopia versus 13.5 in India and 32.9 in the United States (U.S.) and 0.5 ATMs per 100,000 people in Ethiopia versus 19.7 in India and 173 in the U.S.) (The World Bank 2015a; 2015b). Furthermore, only an estimated 62 percent of adults globally have a banking account through a formal financial institution, leaving over 2 billion adults unbanked (Demirgüç–Kunt et al., 2015). While conventional banks have struggled to extend their networks into low-income and rural communities, digital financial services (DFS) have the potential to extend financial opportunities to these groups (Radcliffe & Voorhies, 2012). In order to utilize DFS however, users must convert physical cash to electronic money which requires access to cash-in, cash-out (CICO) networks—physical access points including bank branches but also including “branchless banking" access points such as ATMs, point-of-sale (POS) terminals, agents, and cash merchants. As mobile money and branchless banking expand, countries are developing new regulations to govern their operations (Lyman, Ivatury, & Staschen, 2006; Lyman, Pickens, & Porteous, 2008; Ivatury & Mas, 2008), including regulations targeting aspects of the different CICO interfaces.
EPAR's work on CICO networks consists of five components. First, we summarize types of recent mobile money and branchless banking regulations related to CICO networks and review available evidence on the impacts these regulations may have on markets and consumers. In addition to this technical report we developed a short addendum (EPAR 355a) which includes a description of findings on patterns around CICO regulations over time. Another addendum (EPAR 355b) summarizes trends in exclusivity regulations including overall trends, country-specific approaches to exclusivity, and a table showing how available data on DFS adoption from FII and GSMA might relate to changes in exclusivity policies over time. A third addendum (EPAR 355c) explores trends in CICO network expansion with a focus on policies seeking to improve access among more remote or under-served populations. Lastly, we developed a database of CICO regulations, including a regulatory decision options table which outlines the key decisions that countries can make to regulate CICOs and a timeline of when specific regulations related to CICOs were introduced in eight focus countries, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Tanzania, and Uganda.
A “new wave” of digital credit products has entered the digital financial services (DFS) market in recent years. These products differ from traditional credit by offering loans to borrowers that can be applied for, approved, and disbursed remotely (often without any brick-and-mortar infrastructure), automatically (generally minimizing or eliminating person-to-person interaction), and instantly (often in less than 72 hours). Digital credit also increasingly considers creditworthiness by using alternative (nontraditional) data—ranging from mobile phone activity to utility payments and social media data—potentially allowing for loans to populations previously unable to access bank credit. Two EPAR reports review the characteristics of digital credit offerings in India, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda, and regulations specific to digital credit in Africa and Asia.
In Sub-Saharan Africa, 12% of adults now report having a mobile money account, representing over a quarter of the share of those who have any kind of financial account at all. As mobile money expands, there is interest in how regulatory frameworks develop to support digital financial services (DFS) and also support broader financial inclusion. In theory, protecting consumers from risk, and ensuring that they have the information and understanding required to make informed decisions, may increase their confidence and trust in mobile money systems, leading to higher adoption and usage rates. However, consumer protection regulations may also carry certain trade-offs in terms of cost, usage, and innovation. The challenge, according to proponents of consumer protection, is to develop regulations that promote access and innovation, yet still offer an acceptable level of consumer protection. We review the literature on consumer protection institutions and regulatory documents for DFS (particularly mobile money) in 22 developing countries, and identify examples of specific consumer protection regulations relevant to mobile money in each country.
In recent years, product supply chains for agricultural goods have become increasingly globalized. As a result, greater numbers of smallholder farmers in South Asia (SA) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) participate in global supply chains, many of them through contract farming (CF). CF is an arrangement between a farmer and a processing or marketing firm for the production and supply of agricultural products, often at predetermined prices. This literature review finds empirical evidence that demonstrates that the economic and social benefits of CF for smallholder farmers are mixed. A number of studies suggest that CF may improve farmer productivity, reduce production risk and transaction costs, and increase farmer incomes. However, critics caution that CF may undermine farmers’ relative bargaining power and increase health, environmental, and financial risk through exposure to monopsonistic markets, weak contract environments, and unfamiliar agricultural technologies. There is consensus across the literature that CF has the best outcomes for farmers when farmers have more bargaining power to negotiate the terms of the contract. In reviewing the literature on CF, we find a number of challenges to comparing studies and evaluating outcomes across contracts. This literature review summarizes empirical findings and analyses regarding contract models and best practices to increase farmers’ bargaining power and decrease contract default.